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People generally prefer risky options, which have fully specified outcome probabilities, to 
ambiguous options, which have unspecified probabilities. This preference, formalized in 
economics, is strong enough that people will reliably prefer a risky option to an ambiguous option 
with a greater expected value. Explanations for ambiguity aversion often invoke uniquely human 
faculties like language, self-justification, or a desire to avoid public embarrassment. Challenging 
these ideas, here we demonstrate that a preference for unambiguous options is shared with 
rhesus macaques. We trained four monkeys to choose between pairs of options that both offered 
explicitly cued probabilities of large and small juice outcomes. We then introduced occasional 
trials where one of the options was obscured and examined their resulting preferences; we 
ran humans in a parallel experiment on a nearly identical task. We found that monkeys reliably 
preferred risky options to ambiguous ones, even when this bias was costly, closely matching 
the behavior of humans in the analogous task. Notably, ambiguity aversion varied parametrically 
with the extent of ambiguity. As expected, ambiguity aversion gradually declined as monkeys 
learned the underlying probability distribution of rewards. These data indicate that ambiguity 
aversion reflects fundamental cognitive biases shared with other animals rather than uniquely 
human factors guiding decisions.
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Humans reliably prefer risky options to ambiguous ones in a vari-
ety of laboratory and real-world situations, and will pay a premium to 
avoid ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Curley et al., 1986; Fox 
and Tversky, 1995). Precisely why people avoid ambiguity remains 
unclear. Several proposed explanations focus on uniquely human fac-
tors, including verbally representing probabilities, the need to justify 
one’s decision (Curley et al., 1986), the assumption that the “deck is 
stacked” by one’s opponent (Kühberger and Perner, 2003), and the 
desire to avoid public embarrassment (Heath and Tversky, 1991). 
Since ambiguity aversion has never been demonstrated experimen-
tally in any animal, these explanations remain to be fully tested.
To address these issues experimentally, we probed the preferences 
of monkeys amongst options characterized by different degrees of 
uncertainty about the probability of obtaining a large reward if cho-
sen. Here we use the terms risky and ambiguous to refer to options 
whose reward probabilities are either fully specified or obscured, 
although we note that knowledge about probability more likely var-
ies along a continuum in real life situations. We found that mon-
keys, like humans, are averse to ambiguity, and that this aversion 
increases parametrically with degree of uncertainty. The preferences 
observed in monkeys closely matched those found in humans in a 
nearly identical task. These findings have important implications for 
understanding economic decision-making, uncertainty, and learn-
ing, as well as the evolution of human cognitive biases.
Materials and Methods
All experiments have been approved by the Duke University IACUC 
and IRB, and confirm to relevant regulatory standards. Informed 
consent was obtained from human subjects.
introduction
Risk and ambiguity are two forms of uncertainty distinguished 
by the amount of uncertainty associated with the likelihoods of 
their outcomes. Whereas the outcome of a risky choice is drawn 
from a distribution known by the decision-maker, the outcome 
of an ambiguous choice is drawn from an unknown distribution. 
The distinction between the two is often illustrated by the Ellsberg 
paradox, in which the subject chooses between two urns contain-
ing colored balls: the risky urn contains an equal number of blue 
(high reward) and red (low reward) balls while the ambiguous urn 
contains an unknown number of each ball. A ball is drawn blindly 
from the chosen urn and a large or small reward is given, depend-
ing on the color of the ball. Even when informed that the ratio of 
balls from the second urn is selected at random, people consistently 
prefer known probability distributions to unknown ones – even if 
the unknown has greater expected value (Ellsberg, 1961).
Economists and psychologists have long recognized that these 
two forms of uncertainty have dissociable influences on behavior, 
so a complete explication of decision-making under uncertainty 
must encompass both (Keynes, 1921; Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961; 
Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982; Frisch and Baron, 1988; Camerer and 
Weber, 1992; Fox and Tversky, 1995; Yu and Dayan, 2005). A similar 
distinction, between expected and unexpected uncertainty, features 
prominently in learning theory (Yu and Dayan, 2002; Dayan and Yu, 
2006). Far from a mere economic and mathematical curiosity, the 
distinction between different forms of uncertainty has important 
implications for business, medicine, microeconomic theory, and 
neuroscience (Knight, 1921; Epstein and Wang, 1994; Hsu et al., 
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that choosing that bar would yield a large reward (Figure 1C). 
The red portion indicated the probability that choosing that bar 
would yield a small reward. All probability bars were 80 pixels wide 
and 300 pixels tall. The occluder was either 150, 225, or 300 pixels 
tall (depending on the level of ambiguity; see below) and always 
200 pixels wide.
The monkey had 1 s to inspect these stimuli. Casual observa-
tion showed that monkeys reliably looked at both bars during this 
period. Next, a small yellow fixation point appeared at the center of 
the monitor. Once eye position was aligned with this point (±0.5°), 
the monkey was required to maintain fixation for 1 s. The fixation 
point was then extinguished, and two response targets appeared. 
These were small yellow squares overlaid on the center of the prob-
ability bars. The monkey then had to select one of these bars by 
shifting gaze to it (±3°). Following the saccade, the gamble was 
immediately resolved by the delivery of a reward. All task stimuli 
were then extinguished. The reward probabilities for the ambiguous 
option were never revealed.
The cyan occluder appeared on all trials. On two-thirds of 
trials, the occluder appeared at a random location on the screen, 
and sometimes covered part of the bar without obscuring infor-
mation  about  probabilities  (Figure 1D).  On  these  trials,  the 
horizontal position of the occluder was randomly jittered. On 
one-third of trials (ambiguous trials), the occluder obscured the 
center of one of the bars at the intersection of the blue and red 
portions (Figure 1E). The height of the occluder on the ambigu-
ous option was equally likely to be 150, 225, or 300 pixels; the 
resulting occluders were called low, medium, and high ambiguity 
occluders, respectively.
 Monkey behavioral techniques
All animal procedures were approved by the Duke University 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and were designed 
and conducted in compliance with the Public Health Service’s 
Guide for the Care and Use of Animals. Four male rhesus mon-
keys (Macaca mulatta) served as subjects. Prior to the beginning 
of experiments, a small head-holding prosthesis was implanted 
in  all  animals  using  standard  surgical  techniques  to  permit 
high-resolution measurement of eye position and intracerebral 
neurophysiological  recording  (not  reported  here).  Six  weeks 
later, animals were habituated to training conditions and then 
trained to perform oculomotor tasks. To motivate behavior, 
monkeys were placed on controlled access to fluid outside of 
experimental sessions and task performance was reinforced with 
liquid rewards.
Horizontal and vertical eye positions were sampled at 1000 Hz 
by  an  infrared  eye-monitoring  camera  system  (SR  Research, 
Osgoode, ON, Canada). Stimuli were controlled by a computer 
running Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) with Psychtoolbox 
(Brainard, 1997) and Eyelink Toolbox (Cornelissen et al., 2002). 
Visual stimuli were colored rectangles on a computer monitor 
placed directly in front of the animal and centered on his eyes. A 
standard solenoid valve controlled the duration of juice delivery. 
Reward volume was 67, 200, or 333 μL in all cases.
Every trial began when two bars and one potential occluder 
appeared (Figure 1A). Each bar was divided into a blue portion 
and a red portion, or was completely gray (indicating a 100% 
probability of a medium sized reward; Figure 1B). For the risky 
targets, the blue portion, always on top, indicated the probability 
Figure 1 | Task and stimuli. (A) Task design. Monkeys had 1 s to freely inspect the 
bars. When a small yellow fixation square appeared, they had to look at it and 
maintain fixation for 1 s. The square then disappeared, and they were free to shift 
gaze to one of the two targets. They then received the appropriate reward and 
waited through a short inter-trial interval (ITI). (B–F) Examples of stimuli used in this 
task. (B) Gray bar, certain stimulus, yields 200 μL juice. (C) Examples of risky 
options. Blue/red bars yield either 333 or 67 μL juice; probability can vary from 0 to 
100%. In this example, probabilities of large reward are 50, 88, and 17%, 
corresponding to the size of the blue portion of the bar. (D) Example of risky option 
with partially covering occluder that did not render probabilities ambiguous. (e) 
Ambiguous options. The size of the occluder rendered the bar either low, medium, 
or high ambiguity (left to right). (F) Examples of stimuli used in triple bar control task.www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 166  |  3
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given. Participants obtained 50, 140, or 230 points; these values 
  corresponded to the small, certain, and large rewards in the monkey 
task. Rewards were indicated at the end of each trial with text on 
the monitor for 1 s. Cumulative score was indicated with text on 
the monitor for 3 s every 10 trials. Participants performed three 
blocks of 250 trials. Participants were not required to fixate, but 
pressed the space bar on the keyboard to initiate trials. Participants 
did not indicate choices with saccades, but by pressing the left and 
right arrows on the keyboard.
Participants were read the following script before beginning. 
“On each trial, you will choose between two options. Each option 
is represented by a bar, and can pay either 50, 140, or 230 points. 
The colors of the bars give information about the probabilities of 
these two possibilities. When the options appear, press the space 
bar and then either the left or right arrows. Your goal is to get the 
most points you can. This is all I can tell you right now. Good 
luck.” Participants were asked to explain their interpretations of 
the meaning of the stimuli at the end of the entire session by an 
undergraduate researcher who was blind to the hypotheses of the 
experiment. All participants were paid $10.
results
All four monkeys preferred risky options to ambiguous options 
(Figures 2A,B). Although monkeys were more likely to choose the 
risky option over the ambiguous option the greater the expected 
value of the risky option, there was a strong overall bias toward 
the risky option (Figure 2A). The PSE measures the probability of 
large reward for the risky option for which the monkey chooses 
the ambiguous option equally often; a PSE below 50% indicates 
ambiguity aversion (Deaner et al., 2005; Hayden et al., 2007). 
Monkeys’ average PSE for ambiguous options was a risky option 
with 30% chance of large reward, meaning that they required a 
premium of 53 μL of juice to choose the ambiguous option. This 
amount is substantial – 15.9% the size of the large reward, and 80% 
the size of the small reward. All four monkeys had PSEs less than 
50% [mean 29.9%, t(3) = −4.4, p = 0.02, Figure 2B]. These data 
demonstrate that monkeys distinguish degrees of uncertainty, and, 
like humans, are reluctant to choose ambiguous gambles. Monkeys 
showed greater aversion to the high ambiguity option than the 
medium and low ambiguity options (Figure 2C, bootstrap t-test, 
p < 0.001 in both cases). This preference pattern indicates that mon-
keys were not simply reluctant to choose an obscured bar, which 
may have appeared to be an entirely novel stimulus, but rather were 
systematically averse to the level of uncertainty associated with the 
ambiguous option.
To be certain that our task tapped into traditional ambiguity 
aversion, we examined behavior of 10 human participants in an 
analogous task for monetary rewards using the same test stimuli, 
without providing instructions about the relationship between the 
bar stimuli and reward probabilities (Figure 3). We found that 
people, like monkeys, preferred risky options to ambiguous options 
(population PSE 42, n = 7500 trials, bootstrap t-test p < 0.001). The 
distribution of individual PSEs was also significantly biased toward 
ambiguity aversion (mean of individual PSEs = 41.6, p = 0.019). We 
observed a significant preference for risky options in 5/10 partici-
pants and a preference for ambiguous options in two participants 
(p < 0.05, bootstrap t-test). No significant changes in preferences 
The probability that the ambiguous option would provide a large 
reward was drawn from a uniform distribution of the probabilities 
within the range of those obscured by the occluder, and an outcome 
was chosen accordingly. This is mathematically equivalent to a 50% 
probability of a large reward on all ambiguous trials, and the expected 
value of the ambiguous option was always 200 μL. On a small minor-
ity of risky trials, the occluder covered only a portion of the bar; on 
such trials, the border between the blue and red regions was visible, 
and these trials were considered risky options in all analyses. Finally, 
on 10% of trials (chosen randomly), a gray bar appeared instead of 
one of the two red/blue bars; this option had a 100% probability of 
a medium sized reward (200 μL) and was considered certain.
 the triple bar control task
We were concerned that monkeys would adopt a strategy such as 
“look for the largest blue bar” that would bias them away from 
the occluded options. We performed a control experiment to test 
for this possibility (Figure 1F). In the Triple Bar control, the two 
bars were each divided into three sections – blue, gray, and red – 
that independently indicated the probability of a large, medium, 
or small reward. As in the standard task, the amount of blue and 
red indicated the probabilities of obtaining the large (333 μL) and 
small (67 μL) rewards, respectively. In this control task, the size of 
the gray portion of the bar indicated the probability of obtaining a 
medium reward (200 μL). As in the standard task, all probabilities 
were drawn from a uniform distribution. To reduce the possibility 
that the monkeys would learn this task and treat it differently from 
the standard task, we recorded behavior on only one short (∼500 
trials) session with no training. During the Triple Bar control, the 
occluder never covered the bars.
 analyses
We calculated the point of subjective equivalence (PSE) between 
risky and ambiguous options (Deaner et al., 2005). We first fit a 
cumulative Gaussian function to the monkeys’ choices of risky over 
ambiguous options, as a function of the expected value of the risky 
option. (Because only two outcomes were used, the probability 
scaled linearly with the expected value, so these are interchangeable 
in this task.) We used a least-squares minimization method (Matlab 
Statistics Toolbox) with four free parameters: mean, variance, gain, 
and bias. To estimate standard errors on PSEs, we calculated the 
standard error of a distribution of 10 PSEs calculated on 10 sub-
sets randomly selected (without replacement) from the original 
data. The resulting PSE provides a revealed preference measure 
of value assigned to the ambiguous option. Any PSE below 50% 
reflects a preference for the risky option and an aversion to the 
ambiguous option.
 huMan behavior
All procedures were approved by the Duke University Institutional 
Review Board. Behavior of 10 human participants in a human 
analog of the task was analyzed. Participants were recruited from 
the undergraduate and graduate population of Duke University. 
No participants had extensive psychological, neuroscientific, or 
economic training. Participants were merely told to maximize the 
number of points earned on each trial. All parameters of the task 
were identical with the following exceptions. No juice rewards were Frontiers in Neuroscience  |  Decision Neuroscience    September 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 166  |  4
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they noticed about the task, all participants stated that they quickly 
came to recognize that the occluder obscured information about 
outcome probabilities even though they had not been told this fact. 
The similarity between human and monkey performance suggests 
that individuals of both species readily interpreted the bar stimuli 
as reward probability cues and that the cyan rectangle occasionally 
obscured such information.
On a subset of trials, the occluder partially covered the bar, but 
did not cover the border between the blue and red sections. On 
these trials, information about probabilities was available, and so 
no ambiguity aversion should be observed. Indeed, we observed 
no difference in monkeys’ preferences for these partially covered 
bars and fully uncovered bars (Figure 4A, no difference, p > 0.4, 
bootstrap t-test). We further tested this idea of novelty aversion with 
a behavioral control performed near the conclusion of data collec-
tion. On 50% of trials, the occluder was magenta, making it a novel 
stimulus compared to the normal cyan occluder. We found that 
monkeys’ preferences for options obscured by the two differently 
colored occluders were indistinguishable statistically (Figure 4B, 
p > 0.5, binomial test).
If monkeys learn about the underlying probabilities of ambigu-
ous options, PSEs should eventually converge on 50%. For two of 
the monkeys in this study (monkeys E and O), we continued to col-
lect data for several months. PSEs for these two monkeys gradually 
approached indifference after 40–50 individual behavioral sessions 
(Figure 4C). PSEs in the final 10 sessions were significantly higher 
than those during the first 10 sessions (p < 0.05 for both animals 
individually, bootstrap t-test) and were not significantly different 
from 50% (p > 0.3 for both animals; binomial test). Despite this evi-
dence for learning, monkeys never developed an outright preference 
for the ambiguous option during the course of this experiment.
were observed over the course of the single session (three blocks 
of trials, one-way ANOVA, p > 0.5). Preferences for certainty were 
weaker in human participants than in monkeys. This distinction 
may reflect differences in motivation, familiarity with abstract 
probabilities or familiarity with the task. To assess our human 
participants’ motivations, an experimenter naïve to the goals of 
the study debriefed them in detail. When asked to explain what 
Figure 3 | Humans, like monkeys, preferred options with known 
probabilities. Conventions as in Figure 2A.
Figure 2 | Ambiguity aversion in monkeys. (A) Behavioral preference for 
risky over ambiguous options. Dots represent frequency of choosing risky 
option for each of the 100 individual risky probabilities on risky vs. ambiguous 
trials. Line is a best-fit cumulative Gaussian. The point of subjective equivalence 
(PSE, shown by vertical gray dashed line) indicates values at which subjects 
were indifferent to the two options. The PSE is smaller than 50, indicating that 
monkeys were ambiguity-averse. (B) Individually, all four monkeys showed 
ambiguity aversion (PSE significantly less than 50). (C) Ambiguity aversion varied 
parametrically with degree of ambiguity. Greatest aversion was observed for 
high uncertainty options.www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 166  |  5
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curve. This plot thus also demonstrates that the monkeys were less 
likely to choose the inferior (i.e., less probable) option as the penalty 
grew. We observed no systematic changes in preferences between 
two risky options over the course of behavioral training.
Second, ambiguity aversion did not simply arise from reinforce-
ment learning mediated associations of the bar stimuli. In principle, 
monkeys could derive a value for each of the 100 different bar 
patterns based on an integrated reward history, and choose based 
on these reward associations (Thorndike, 1911). To address this 
concern, we analyzed preferences for the bars the first time each 
target appeared. Because monkeys confused targets that were within 
3 pixels of each other (see above), we restricted this analysis to the 
first time a stimulus or any other stimulus that could be confused 
with it appeared. These data therefore all originate from the first 
day of behavioral training with the risky bars. Before this, mon-
keys had been trained only on all-blue and all-red certain bars. 
This restriction limited us to 14 or 15 trials total for each monkey, 
and makes this test very conservative. Nonetheless, we found that 
even on these early trials, three of the four monkeys expressed a 
significant preference for the option with greater EV (p < 0.03 in 
all cases, bootstrap t-test). This analysis provides strong evidence 
that monkeys generalized the meaning of the blue and red bars to 
mixed bars.
Third, monkeys did not merely adopt a strategy such as “look for 
the largest blue bar” that would bias them away from the occluded 
options (including the ambiguous ones). The fact that monkeys 
did not avoid partially occluded options that did not fully obscure 
reward probability information speaks to this issue (Figure 4A). 
To directly test this possibility, we performed a control experiment 
in which the two bars were each divided into three sections – blue, 
gray, and red – which indicated the probability of a large, medium, 
Although not the main focus of our study, we also examined 
choices between risky and certain options. All four monkeys sig-
nificantly preferred risky options to certain options with the same 
expected value (p < 0.001 in all cases). On average, monkeys sac-
rificed a potentially larger reward of 71 μL of juice to choose the 
risky option instead of the certain option, and preferred 50:50 risky 
options to certain options on 72% of trials. These findings are 
consistent with previous studies showing that rhesus macaques 
choose risky options about 75% of the time over certain options 
in an uncued gambling task with highly familiar probability con-
tingencies (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Hayden et al., 2008a,b). Our 
task occasionally pitted the ambiguous option against the certain 
option. Monkeys weakly preferred the ambiguous option to the 
certain option (they chose the ambiguous option on 58.9% of 
these trials, binomial test, p = 0.0024). This preference was weaker 
than the monkeys’ preference for the risky option over the certain 
option (71% of trials). The observed preference for the ambiguous 
and risky options over the certain option may reflect exploration 
strategies aimed at learning the underlying probability distributions 
(Hayden et al., 2008a; Pearson et al., 2009).
Several additional control analyses and experiments confirm 
that ambiguity aversion does not reflect other processes such as 
difficulty in distinguishing the stimuli or simple reinforcement 
learning. First, ambiguity aversion did not arise from poor dis-
crimination of the bars used to symbolically cue reward probability. 
Monkeys were better than chance at distinguishing similar bars that 
differed by as few as 4% (12 pixels on the monitor, p = 0.026 for 
4%, p < 0.001 for all larger differences, bootstrap t-test, Figure 5A). 
This figure indicates monkeys’ preference behavior when choosing 
between pairs of risky options, in the absence of an ambiguous one. 
Preferences for larger differences followed a simple psychometric 
Figure 4 | (A) Monkeys did not avoid occluders that did not obscure reward 
probability information. (B) Monkeys treated a new, magenta occluder the same 
as the previously encountered cyan occluder, demonstrating that preference do 
not reflect novelty aversion. (C) Monkeys learned reward probability distributions 
associated with ambiguous options over time. PSEs for the two most 
extensively tested monkeys, O (orange) and E (blue), plotted over the course of 
behavioral sessions. PSE indicates average level of aversion to ambiguous 
options for a session; values below 50% represent aversion, values at 50% 
(indicated by horizontal gray line) represent neutrality. Horizontal axis refers to 
recoding session number. Each session consisted of ∼1500–2500 trials.Frontiers in Neuroscience  |  Decision Neuroscience    September 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 166  |  6
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non-human animals, like humans, are sensitive to the distinction 
between risk and ambiguity, and prefer options with full informa-
tion. Because it is impossible to know the content of the monkeys’ 
thoughts, we cannot be completely certain that the monkeys in our 
task understood the concepts of probabilities and relative degrees 
of uncertainty. Nonetheless, the monkeys’ pattern of performance, 
and their behavior on the controls, is most straightforwardly inter-
preted in this context.
Uncertainty is a ubiquitous and inevitable aspect of decision-
making. The distinction between risk and ambiguity, and between 
expected and unexpected uncertainty, is a fundamental and natural 
one (Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961; Becker and Brownson, 1964; 
Camerer and Weber, 1992; Yu and Dayan, 2005). For example, canny 
decision-makers should more fully engage learning processes when 
confronted with unexpected uncertainty (Frisch and Baron, 1988; 
Yu and Dayan, 2005; Dayan and Yu, 2006). Thus, it should not be 
surprising that monkeys readily make this distinction.
Indeed, our findings imply that the cognitive processes motivat-
ing human preferences for certainty are shared with non-human 
primates. Furthermore, our data endorse the idea that ambiguity 
aversion does not reflect uniquely human faculties or motivations 
such as language, the need to justify one’s decision, aversion to 
competition with a skilled opponent, the desire to avoid the embar-
rassment or regret of a decision that is later revealed to have been 
unwise, or feelings of competence within a domain of knowledge 
(Curley et al., 1986; Heath and Tversky, 1991; Kühberger and 
Perner, 2003).
Monkeys’  simultaneous  preference  for  risk  and  aversion 
to ambiguity seems surprising from an economic perspective 
(Ellsberg, 1961; Becker and Brownson, 1964; Frisch and Baron, 
1988; Camerer and Weber, 1992; Fox and Tversky, 1995). Because 
unspecified probabilities are in some sense a form of compounded 
uncertainty,  some  economists  have  proposed  that  ambiguity 
aversion in humans may be an extension of risk aversion (Frisch 
and Baron, 1988). By contrast, our results suggest that monkeys’ 
or small reward, respectively (Figure 5B). We reasoned that if the 
monkeys simply associated the blue option with large reward, and 
selectively chose the option with the larger blue area, then behav-
ior would not depend on the relative amounts of red and gray. By 
the same token, if the monkeys simply associated the color red 
with small reward, then behavior would not depend on the relative 
amounts of blue and gray. However, if the monkeys understood 
that the relative size of the red and blue sections corresponded to 
outcome probabilities, they would rapidly generalize to a three-
color bar.
We performed this task on three of the four monkeys. As in 
the standard task, the amount of blue and red indicated the prob-
abilities of obtaining the large (333 μL) and small (67 μL) rewards, 
respectively. In this control task, the size of the gray bar indicated 
the probability of obtaining a medium sized reward (200 μL). As 
in the standard task, all probabilities were drawn from a uniform 
distribution. To reduce the possibility that the monkeys would learn 
this task and thus treat it differently from the standard task, we 
recorded behavior on only one brief (∼500 trials) session with no 
training. We found that choices varied lawfully as a function of 
both blue and red sections, indicating that monkeys attended to the 
lengths of both (Figure 3). The results of this control experiment 
demonstrate that monkeys readily use information about prob-
abilities presented in an abstract and continuously varying form, 
and that they interpret occluders as obscuring that information.
discussion
Our findings demonstrate that monkeys prefer explicit informa-
tion about reward probability distributions and avoid options in 
which this information is obscured – just as humans do. Moreover, 
monkeys’ behavior in this task closely matched that of humans 
in a very similar task; human participants interpreted their task 
in a manner consistent with conventional definitions of risk and 
ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961; Frisch and Baron, 1988; Camerer and 
Weber, 1992; Fox and Tversky, 1995). These findings indicate that 
Figure 5 | Ambiguity aversion is not an artifact of poor stimulus 
discrimination or heuristic strategies. (A) Stimulus discrimination. The y axis 
gives the monkeys’ probability of choosing the target with the greater 
expected value (the bluer bar) on risk–risk trials, as a function of the difference 
in amount of blue (or red) between the two available targets (x axis). (B) Plot of 
the probability of choosing the rightward target, as a function of the size of the 
red and blue portions of the bars on the left and the right (as indicated in the 
legend to the right of the plot). Horizontal axis corresponds to size of either red 
or blue bar portion. Vertical axis indicates probability of choosing right-side 
target. Preferences vary roughly with both blue and red bar portions, indicating 
that monkeys attend to both in their decisions. Data is smoothed for 
presentation.www.frontiersin.org  September 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 166  |  7
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ences are mediated by distinct psychological and neural mecha-
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